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7 
SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE 
Jeannine Plamondon 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally in E urope, the state has had ultimate authority. With the creation of the 
E uropean Union, however, states have delegated some authority and binding decision-
n.1aking power to supranational institutions. This shift in the power structure has not only 
led to the consolidatio n of control away from the state toward supranational institutions, but 
has also led to the arguably unintended devolution of control away £i·onl the state toward 
regional governments (Loughlin 141). The state's relinquishing of power to the E uropean 
Union in many ways has served the interest of stateless nations l and independence seeking-
groups. This paper will examine the role that the European Union has played for stateless 
nations and will show that the EU has granted these groups grea ter autonomy and 
representati on. It will then go on to examine how the EU can better address the needs of 
stateless nations based o n current trends and the desires of independence-seeking groups. 
Most states in E urope are not nation states; states are often composed of two or more 
distinct nationalities,2 yet in this organization of multiple nationalities within one governing 
unit, one nationality almost inevitably asserts itself upon the others and becom es the 
dominant culture of the country, relegJting the o thers to Ininori ty status Ooan i Marl 112). 
Stateless nations see great promise in the European Union because the EU is in many 
aspects a supranational institution that combines many languages, cultures, and nations under 
one conunon governance-structure. Many of the EU member states are small countries, yet 
upon their accession to the Union , their voices and concerns becom e, at least in theory, 
equal with those o flarge member states such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 
Thus stateless nations within member states see m embership in the European Union as a 
golden opportunity fo r increased representation and autonomy. If a nation as small as Malta, 
with but 400,000 citizens has the right to have its voice hea rd in the EU, then w hy not 
Catalonia, with 7 million citizens? 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND REGIONALISM 
In this paper, I will examine stateless nations and their position in the European 
Union through the lens of governance theory, as traditional International Relations (IR) 
and comparative politics theories often fail to examine the effects that sub-state actors have 
on the European Union and vice versa. The governance approach instead "draws on both 
IR and comparative politics and considers the EU as neither a traditional international 
organization nor as a domestic 'political system', but rather as a new and emerging system of 
'governance without government'" (Pollack 36). Governance is defined as "self-organizing, 
interorganizational networks" with four basic characteristics: "interdependence between 
organizations, continuing interactions between network members, game-like interactions, 
and a sign!ficallt a11lount of autonomy ./i"Ol11 the state" (Pollack 37 emphasis added). 
Gary Marks is credited as being the founder of multi-level governance theory that 
deals specifically with the efIects of the supranational institutions on sub-state actors as well 
as on the traditional state. Marks argues against intergovernmentalist theorists such as 
Moravcsik by positing that in the EU states are losing power to both the European 
Commission at the supranational level as well as to the local and regional governments 
within the states (Pollack 39). Marks claims "supranational and sub-national actors (a)re 
chipping away at the traditional dominance and control of national governments" (Pollack 
39). The manner in which these sub-state actors chip away at state centred dominance will 
be examined below. 
THE CONCEPT OF REGIONALISM 
In their quest for increased representation and independence, many stateless nations 
and regional actors in Europe promote the idea of regionalism or a 'Europe of the Regions'. 
During the beginning ~tages of European integration, regionalism was interpreted as a 
federal European government with regions and sub-national govermnents taking over lnany 
of the functions of the traditional member states (Loughlin 150). In 1963 French federalist 
author Guy He-raud defined regions as "the ancient ethnic or submerged nations in Europe 
whose right to statehood had been denied by their inclusion in 'artificial' nations 
constructed around the domination of one powerful ethnic group" (Loughlin 1996,150). 
He-raud also argued "Europe was a route by which these submerged nations could escape 
trom the clutches of their oppressive nation-states by becoming part of a wider European 
federation" (Loughlin 150-1). 
Regionalism and the concept of a 'Europe of the Regions' today is more widely 
accepted and not strictly an idea supported by separatist groups (for example, the German 
Lander, under German federalism, are powerful regions in the EU). This concept continues 
to serve the interests of stateless nations, however, because it is the n1.eans by which the 
European Union transfers power and autonomy to regional governments (and, as noted 
above, many stateless nations constitute a region and control local and regional governments 
within the larger member state) (Loughlin 154). 
According to Michael Keating, the current organizational structure of Europe is 
conducive to national mobilizations because it is "complex and relatively disorganized. It 
does not have a single focus of authority and does not make universal claims to allegiance 
or identity. It can, therefore, be embraced by stateless nations and emerging regions as a more 
neutral forum than the state, and a place where questions of sovereignty and ultimate 
authority are necessarily ambiguous" (46). 
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SECTION I: CURRENT TRENDS IN DEVOLUTION 
1. EU Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds 
T he first and one of the m ost important ways that sub-national actors gain autono my 
within the structure of the European Union is the use of structural funds (Pollack 39). As 
part of the EU cohesion policy, funds are granted to specific regions within the E U in o rder 
to help reduce economic disparities throu ghout the Union (Hooghe and Marks 78). In 
1988 the manner in which these fimds were distributed was refo rmed and the new 
regulati ons stipulated that the Conunission must work in a partnership with regional 
authorities in addition to state authorities in order to ensure the effective implem.entation 
of funding (H ooghe and Marks 78) . Structural funds thus give sub-national govenU11ents 
more autonomy as they are provided with a source of funding outside the national 
govenunent and they are empowered to work directly with the supra national institutio n of 
the European C ommission without the traditional intervention of the state. H ooghe and 
Marks argue that in Belgium and Spain (both countries with sizeable stateless nations, which 
are already quite organized and powelful) "cohesion policy feeds into pressures fo r 
regionalization and the ongoing conflict concerning the allocation of competencies across 
levels of government" (80). Although H ooghe and Marks acknowledge that structural 
funding has not had as significant effects for all countries as it has in countries w here 
regio nalism is already well defined such as Belgium and Spain, the new cohesio n policy 
regulations have brought autonomy issues to light in other countries with stateless nations, 
such as France and the United Kingdom. As a result sub-national acto rs in these countries 
have increased their calls for participation at the regional , national and supranational levels 
(81 ). 
2. Institutional representation for regions 
Although initially European integration was the sole domain of central governments, 
there has been a gradual increase in the representation of stateless nations and regio ns 
institutionally within the structure of the ED. The creation of the European Parliament and 
its increase in power over the years has granted stateless nations m ore representation through 
the election of M embers of the European Parliam ent (MEPs) from their regions. MEPs are 
then able to represent the interests of their stateless natio ns directly at the European level. 
Currently there are Members of the European Parliament representing such stateless and 
minority nations as Scotland, Wales, Flanders,Vallee d'Aoste, Catalonia, the Basque Country, 
Galicia, Andalusia, the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, Valencia, and the Russian-
speaking minority in Latvia (Stateless N ations Intergroup par. 1). 
Another nl.Jj or breakthrough for regional representation occurred with the creation 
of the Conullittee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994 (Loughlin155) . The CoR provides an 
official European forum for regional concerns (EU par. 1). Under the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the Council of Ministers and the Conunission must consult with the CoR on all regional 
issues (Hooghe and M arks 78) . Additionally, the CoR may issue advisory opinions o n any 
subject seen as affecting regional interests, which as Loughlin points out, are almost all public 
policy issues in Europe (155). Considering that regional actors are often the o nes 
implementing European-level policy decisions, the opinions and support of the C oR are of 
some consequence (EU par. 5). Loughlin also argues that the significance of the CoR is 
evident in the fact that rather high-profile politicians have been appointed to the committee 
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to represent their regional interests, such as the powerful Catalan President Jordi Pujol who 
will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper (155). In his inaugural address to the 
Committee of the R egions,Jacgues Oelors, former President of the European Conunission, 
stressed the principle of subsidiarity in the European Union and the integral role of the 
CoR in this process of bringing the democracy and decision- making as close to the people 
as possible (Loughlin 157). The CoR helps to bridge the gap between European decision-
makers and sub-national authorities that are often responsible for implem enting the 
decisions taken at the European level (Hooghe and Marks 75). Although stateless nations Jre 
not the only regions represented in the CoR , this body provides stateless nations with a 
forum for representation on the European level independent of the central state. 
3. European-level Cooperation and Representation of the Regions 
Ano~er way in which the European Union has granted increased representation to 
stateless nations is through cross-national regional cooperation (Loughlin 157). As part of a 
supranational organization, a stateless nation is no longer confined to the context of dialogue 
between itself and the central state, but instead can join with other stateless nations and 
regional groups in seeking increased representation by lobbying at the European level 
(Loughlin 157). The E uropean Free Alliance for example is the political party representing 
stateless nations at the European Parliament and is composed of political parties trom over 
thirty-two stateless nations across E urope (EFA par. 3) . EFA has made important strides in 
the European Parliam ent with regards to the protection of minority languages and human 
rights violations of minority groups (EFA par. 4). In N ovember 2006, for example, the 
European Parliament passed a resolution on a new framework strategy for multilingualism, 
which was drafted by EFA MEP Bernat Joan i Mari . This framework strategy, among other 
things, calls on the E uropean Commission to guarantee the respect of linguistic rights of all 
citizens and encourage the availability of communication with the EU in minority as well 
as offi cial EU languages (par. 21). In 2006, EFA held public hearings on the deportation of 
ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and the situation of the stateless people of Latvia, 
which constitute human rights violations of rnembers of minority nations (Greens-EFA par. 
1) . 
EFA MEPs along with members of the Stateless Nations Intergroup of the European 
Parliament also played an active role in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) by 
lobbying fo r increased rights for stateless nations and national minorities in the draft 
European Constitution (EFA 64). T he most radical demand of stateless nations was for an 
' internal enlargem ent clause', which would "permit stateless nations to democratically 
secede from their respective host-states while rem aining members of the European Union" 
(Landau and Vanhala 9). Stateless nations also pushed for minority rights protection 
provisions in the constitution, claiming that general human rights protection often does not 
incorporate issues that are specific to stateless nations and national minorities, such as 
collective cultural and linguistic rights (Landau and Vanhala 9). Although these provisions 
were not accepted in the draft Constitution, due to their conflicting nature with the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states, according to Landau and Vanhala, 
the fact that stateless and minority nations were involved "in the drafting process itself signals 
a potentially new system structuring supranational-state-minority relations" (12). 
Another example of European level cooperation is the Assembly of European 
Regions (AER). The AER is an organization that lobbies the European Conmussion for 
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regional interests and has as its goal "J grJssroots Europe where the regions Jre recognized 
JS pillars of democf<lcy and key pJrtners of the European project" (AER par. 1). The AER 
was instrumental in the creation of the CoR (Hooghe and Marks 87). By combining forces 
and working at the European level for conm10n goals of increased autonomy and 
representation, stateless nations and regions are better able to achieve their policy goals than 
by working alone at the national level. 
Stateless nations and other sub-national groups have also gained increased 
representation by lobbying formally and informally for their own interest at the European 
level, in addition to lobbying through institutional channels . M any stateless nations have 
ofrlces in Brussels from which to lobby the European institutions, gather information, and 
network (Hooghe and Marks 82). According to Hooghe and Marks, those regions that are 
most "politically entrenched , most ethnically and politically distinct" are those that are most 
likely to have well orgJnized lobbying offices in Brussels and thus receive the most EU 
attention and funding (83). T he existence of regional offices in Brussels shows that European 
integration has enabled stateless nations to represent their distinct interests at the European 
level, without going throu gh the traditional channels of the nation-state. 
Even within the unitary framework of states, stateless nations have gained increased 
representation at the European level. In the United Kingdom delegation to Brussels, for 
example, Welsh and Scottish civil servants tend to hold appointments in areas of specific 
concern to their regions, such as fisheries policy and regional policy (Hooghe and Marks 
77). From the above examples it is evident that stateless nations have gained much 
representation at the European level, which has led to a greater awareness of their concerns 
and policy decisions favourable to regional interests. 
4. The Idea of Europe in Sub-national Politics 
As evidenced above, membership in the supranational institution of the European 
Union provides stateless nations with a new level of governance from which to receive 
funding, and at which to represent and lobby for their interests; however, membership in the 
European Union also grJnts stateless nations increased leverage with their respective central 
goverlUllents. In Spain for example, the Catalan party COlwelgel1cia i U11i6 agreed to form 
part of a coalition with the Socialist party in exchange for a greater role in EU decision-
making (Hooghe and Marks 77). According to H ooghe and Marks, the Socialist party 
"agreed to re-evaluate regional representation in all EU orgJns and to incorporate regional 
representatives in decision-making on regional competencies" in exchange for COl1vcrgcl1cia 
i UnicJ's support (77). 
In Calalonia and the 'Idea of Europe', Giordano and Roller note that Catalan political 
parties, nationalist and non-nationalist alike, have "Europeanized their discourse", which 
demonstrates a shift not only towards regionalism in the EU, but also a shift towards 
Europeanization in the sub-national regions (99). In the past, Catalonia sought increased 
autonomy and independence by seeking the modernization and transformation of the 
Spanish state; now Catalonia sees the EU and a move towards a Europe of the regions as the 
most effective vehicle for achieving increased independence (Giordano and Roller 102). 
Jo rdi Pujol, the charismatic leader of COl1vcrgcl1cia i Ul1i6, has posited the idea of Europe "in 
which member states coexist with sub-national authorities on an equal level" (Giordano and 
Roller 104). Pujol has also raised public support for Catalonia as a nation throughou t 
Europe through his public and private visits abroad and his participation in international 
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organizations (such as the CoR) (104). 
The Scottish N ational Party (SNP), the main independence-seeking party in 
Scotland, has also Europeanized its discourse over the last twenty years. In 1988 the SNP 
began the " Independence w ithin Europe" campaign in order to combat criticism that 
Scotland would not be economically viable as an independent state and gain support for 
independence at the local level (SNP par. 5). 
In lJlany stateless nations public opinion in £1VOur of the European Union is high 
because the people see Europe as a new level of governance that tends to be more 
sympathetic to their interests (SNP par. 6). Stateless nations also argue that if the central 
government is giving up sovereignty to European institutions, then stateless nations have the 
right and obligation to ensure that these decisions taken at the European level are not in 
conflict with their regional interests (SNP par. 6). 
5. Institutional Norms, Conditionality and the Rights of Stateless Notions 
In Ethnic Politics i,1 Europe, Judith Kelley studies European supranational institutions 
and how they allect the treatment of central governments towards stateless nations and 
national lninorities (6). She finds that normative pressure and conditionality from 
international institutions , and the European Union in particular, was significant in 
improving the policy of the central government towards stateless nations (176). Although 
conditionality of acceptance to the EU for candidate states tended to be the most important 
factor in determining behaviour, Kelley also argues that nonnative pressure alone cou ld 
determine compliance in the absence of other factors, such as domestic opposition and 
strong nationalist influence. 
In order to demonstrate specific effects that norms and conditionality have had on 
state policy towards stateless and n~nority nations, Kelley provides case studies from Latvia, 
Estonia , Slovakia, and Romania. In Latvia, for example, despite strong domestic opposition, 
persuasion along with conditionality of EU membership was instrumental in amending a 
strict language law that originally would have placed "difficult or impossible language 
burdens on Russian-speakers" (Kelley 81). The EU pressured Latvia over a period of four 
years (1995-1999) by issuing statements calling on Latvia to change the law in order to be 
in accordance with international standards, engaging in correspondence with Latvian 
officials, and making statements about Latvia's failure to comply in the international press 
(Kelley 81). Finally the EU "made the link to EU admission clear" by stating that "Latvia's 
chance of opening negotiations was good - pending passage of a favourable language law" 
(Kelley 83). In December of 1999, despite fierce domestic opposition, the Latvian 
government approved an amended version of the law that was acceptable to the EU and 
which revoked many of the language requirements intended to discriminate against ethnic 
Russians (Kelley 83) . 
In another Latvian example, normative pressure from the EU combined with the 
conditionality of beginning accession talks was again crucial in aniending legislation that 
was discriminatory towards members of minority nations (Kelley 84). The Latvian 
Citizenship Law denied citizenship to those who had arrived in Latvia after 1940 and 
involved strict requirements for those wishing to become Latvian citizens: knowledge of the 
Latvian language, knowledge of Latvian laws and legal structures, sixteen years residence in 
Latvia , an oath of allegiance, and the renunciation of citizenship of another state (Kelley 84). 
This law also stipulated an annual quota for the number of people to be granted citizenship 
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and refused citizenship to children born in Latvia to non-citizen parents (Kelley 90). The 
EU issued many statements to the Latvian government that included specific changes it 
wished to see in the law and eventually stated that "reform of the citizenship law was a 'key 
criterion' for beginning EU entry talks" (Kelley 91). As a result, the Latvian parliament 
instituted the changes required by the EU by abolishing the annual citizenship quotas and 
giving citizenship to "stateless children" (Kelley 91). 
As the European Union expands eastward, it incorporates an increasing number of 
stateless nations within new member states. For EU candidate countries the possibility of 
EU m embership is enticement enough to persuade them into granting increased 
representation and autonomy to stateless nations within their borders. Although Kelley 
maintains that normative pressure can be significant (in the absence of domestic opposition), 
she does not provide any such examples of normative pressure without associJted 
conditiOiulity in her case studies, which makes the concept of normative pressure difficult 
to apply to current member states without further research. 
5. European Union Involvement in Self-determination Issues 
In recent months, the European Parliament has addressed issues of self-determination 
within current member states. In O ctober 2006, the European Parlialnent addressed the 
peace talks in Spain between the Spanish government and the Basque political party 
Batasuna. Mter a controversial debate, a majority in Parliament came out in support of the 
peace initiative undertaken by the Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
(EP par. 21). Another sovereignty issue recently discussed in a conference at the Parliament 
was the reunification of Ireland and the potential benetlts and difficulties involved in this 
process, drawing from the German example (EP par. 6). Although currently the European 
Parliament and other European institutions have no right to formulate binding policy 
decisions in tlus area, the fa ct that such issues are being debated in the European arena , rather 
than being dismissed as an internal afFair, indicates that increasingly the EU can and will have 
an impact on questions of self-determination. 
SECTION II: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FUTURE ROLE 
From the above evidence, it is clear that the European Uluon is currently playing an 
important role in the increased representation and autonomy of stateless nations , both for 
those belonging to the EU and those desiring to join. Hooghe, Marks, Loughlin, and 
Keating all argue that this trend towards devolution will continue and although regionalism 
will never (and in the interests of stateless nations should never) become uniform across 
European regions, the questions remain as to what progress for autonomy-seeking nations 
is desirable. Many of Europe's stateless nations and governance scholars are predicting and 
calling for reform within the EU institutions to grant these groups more equality and 
representation in Europe. Landau and Vanhala state that the demands of stateless nations can 
be divided into two categories, with recoglution, access, and participation comprising 
constitution-'!ffirming demands whiie separation, autonomy, and independence comprise 
constitution-challenging demands (4). They go on to argue that stateless and nunority nations 
will often begin with constitutions-affirnung demands, but will change from constitution-
affirnung to constitution-challenging demands if the former are not adequately met 
(Landau and Vanhala 5). Additionally, with the increasing acceptance of Eastern European 
countries, many of whom have sizeable stateless nation populations witlun their borders 
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(such as the Roma in Romania, the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, etc.) and a poor track 
record for minority rights and recognition, it is evident that increasingly the European 
institutions will have to deal with minority issues. The following section of this paper will 
address some possible reforms. 
1. A More Representative Official Languages Policy 
One issue that is a major source of contention among stateless nations within the 
European Union is the offIcial EU languages policy. Under the current policy, each state can 
choose which languages it wishes to be official EU languages (generally the official 
language(s) of the state). H ere as in other instances is exposed the unrepresentative nature of 
the state-centred EU; citizens of small states such as Malta with just 400,000 people are able 
to interact with the European institutions in their native language of Maltese, yet 
Catalonians, with 7 millio n speakers must speak Castilian Spanish or another language not 
their native tongue at the E uropean institutions. T his poli cy is ineffi cient at best, as the costs 
for recruiting and training translators for some of the less w idely spoken languages are 
exorbitant, and at worst is unrepresentative of the linguistic diversity and heritage of many 
Europeans. 
As mentioned above, the European Parliament adopted a framework strategy for 
multilingualism drafted by EFA MEP Bernat Joan i M ari . Although the strategy was 
adopted, many of Joan i M ari's main points regarding minority languages were diluted or 
deleted completely. A possible reason for this is that the report demanded more funding and 
programs for translatio n and learning of all minority languages. With approximately sixty 
non-official indigenous languages in the EU area, increased funding for all minority 
languages becomes an expensive and impossible task. By ad vocating increased funding and 
progranUlles for widely spoken non-official languages, however, Joan i Mari would have seen 
more of his regional and minority language policy recommendations passed , and would 
bring increased publicity to the lack of representation of stateless nations at the EU. 
Spain has made some efforts to democratize its languages at the European institutions 
by paying interpretation costs for minority language speakers of Catalan, Basque, and 
Galician upon request (EP par. 3). There still remains much to be done in this area, however, 
as in the everyday functioning of the EU, even Catalan M EPs and Commissioners are not 
able to function in their native tongue, as do so many of their counterparts. It is also 
important to note that Spain is the most progressive state in the EU with regards to minority 
languages policy. Other stateless nations lack the few oppo rtunities to use their native 
tongue at the EU institutions that has been granted to minority language speakers in Spain. 
In the European Parliament Rules of Procedure, it states that all members have the 
right to follow debates and express themselves in their native languages (EP par. 1).Although 
it is evident that providing interpretation into every EU language (official or non-official) 
would be impossible in terms of both logistics and cost, the European Parliament should be 
accessible to native speakers of widely used minority languages. An example of how this 
could be done would be to examine the number of MEPs with a minority language as their 
native tongue as well as the number of constituents overall in the European Union with the 
same native language. When in thes.e circumstances, minority languages are equally or more 
widely-used than the ten m ost conunonly used official languages in the EU, then provisions 
should be made by the EU for the interpretation of these languages upon request of 
participating MEPs. Altho ugh interpretation is costly, all in the European Parliament affirm 
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that multilingualism is an essential aspect of the European institutions, and currently 
interpretation costs constitute just 1 % of the EU budget (EU par. 3). By refo rming 
interpretation procedures in other areas, such as reducing stand-by orders for interpreters, 
which leads to paying for services supplied but not used, the European Parliament will have 
increased interpretation funds available to support the use of regional and minority 
languages in the EU (EU par. 5). 
2. An Increased Role for the Committee of the Regions 
In order to ensure proper representation of stateless nations and regions, there have 
also been calls to increase the power of the Committee of the Regions. T he CoR, as 
discussed above, is m ore representative of the people and nations of Europe, as 
representatives from different regions are assigned based upon the population of each state 
(CoR par. 4). Despite the m ore representative nature of the CoR, its power is largely 
symbolic and it plays a strictly consultative role (H ooghe and Marks 78). Some stateless 
nations and their representatives, such as EFA, have proposed that the European Parliament 
be transformed into a bi- camerJI legislature, in which the citizens are represented in one 
chamber and the nations (including stateless and minoriry natio ns) and the regions 
represented in the other (EFA par. 5) . In a CoR report written for the European 
COl1unission , Catalan President Jordi Pujol called for the CoR to have the status of a 
European Institution, like the Parliament, C om.mission , Council, and European Court of 
Justice, which would give it m ore than simply consultative powers on issues of regional 
concern (Loughlin 156). These changes would increase the autonom.y and representation of 
stateless natio ns within the European institutions. 
3 .. Judicial Representation for Stateless Nations 
A final call for increasing the representation of stateless natio ns is the inclusion of 
minoriry rights in European Human Rights policy. This includes granting territorial entities 
(i.e. stateless nations) within Europe the right to access the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
which currently settles legJI disputes between EU m ember states, EU institutions, 
businesses, and individuals, but not regio nal or sub- national governments (ECJ par. 5). In the 
Sal1l.e report mentioned above, Pujol recommended that the CoR have " the right to bring 
infringements of the principle of subsidiariry to the European C ourt of Justice" (Loughlin 
156). Allowing stateless nations or regional govenunents to bring such cases before the ECJ 
would ensure greater protection of the rights of these regions under European law and 
would ensure increased compliance of member states to principles of subsidiarity. 
Keating suggests that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) also has a more 
important role to play in the promotion of self-determination. He states "a European-wide 
rights regime is emerging that, for the first time, effe ctively separates rights from national 
citizenship" (86). As Keating states, the EU is more than a conU110n market, and the 
European Court of Human Rights shows that Europe is prepared to embrace C0I1U110n 
values (86). Many states within the European Union have members of stateless nations 
within their borders who are denied citizenship and whose language rights and voting rights 
among others are repressed. This is evidenced in the above example of Latvia (which, 
although has made some progress, still has far to go in terms of equal treatment of minority 
nations) (Kelley 87). Another example is that of the 'erased people' of Slovenia who are 
migrants from other former Yugoslav republics who were living in Slovenia but had not 
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obtained Slovenian citizenship at the time of independence. The names of these people were 
effectively erased off of the public registry (Amnesty International par. 5). Increased use of 
the European C ourt of Human Rights for complaints against such violations would ensure 
greater protection of the human rights of stateless and minority natio ns as individuals and 
as a group. In discussing the inclusion of minority rights in the draft European Constitutio n, 
Hungarian Foreign M inister Lazlo Kovacs said, "If. . . the protection of minority rights will 
not be included in the EU constitution ... it would indicate that something has changed, 
that these [constitutional] documents are no longer valid, or that they are not equall y valid 
for everyone" (Landau and Vanhala 11). The same principle can be applied to minority rights 
at the ECHR, if the ECHR does not address minority rights, then it is no longer valid as 
an institution upholding the human rights of all Europeans. 
CONCLUSION 
T he European Union is a unique institution that consolidates power to the 
supranational level on the one hand and devolves power towards sub-national governments 
and regions on the other. T his shift in the traditional power structure away from the central 
state is a great benefit to stateless nations in Europe who gain increased representation by 
acting at the European level and also gain increased autonomy by looking outside the 
central state to receive funding and decision-making powers from the European institutions. 
O ne issue relevant to tllis paper that could be examined further is the specific norm ative 
role that the European Union does and can play in issues of sub- national autonomy, and 
particularly how the effects of normative pressure or even the use of normative pressure 
change over time. The devolution of power to sub-state acto rs is not uniform, but it is 
arguably permanent and will continue to progress as European integration goes wider and 
deeper. It is already clea r that the European Union is playing an increased role in 
determilling the £lte of stateless nations within and without its m ember states. This process 
leads to the necessity for increased representation of stateless nations in the European 
institutions. Although many of these changes in Europe were not foreseen when integration 
first began, they are beneficial not only to stateless nations and nlinorities, but to Europe in 
general as it builds a more representative society - a 'Europe of the R egions' and a 'Europe 
of the Peoples'. 
END NOTES 
1. According to the Stateless N ations Intergroup of the European Parliament, stateless 
nations are " internal nations of ' union states', that is states constituted by historical unions 
of previously independent and self-governing parts. Most such internal nations, or 'stateless 
nations' aspire to, and many have acllieved the status of constitutionally self-governing 
countries within their respective m ember states . .. N evertheless, in the perspective of the 
state's constitution, the powers of these internal nations are legally subordinate powers" (pa r. 
3). Some pronlinent examples include Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, Scotland 
and Wales in the United Kingdom, etc. For the purposes of this paper, this definition also 
includes national nlinorities, which. are "nlinority groups living outside the state with wllich 
they identity historically, culturally or linguistically" such as ethllic Russians in the Baltic 
States, the Macedonian nlinority in Bulgaria, etc. (Landau and Vanhala 2). 
2 . For the purposes of this paper I am not referring to diverse imnligrant 
communities, but rather to established COllli11l1nities of nationalities indigenous to Europe, 
as defined above. 
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